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We propose a new game theoretic approach to modeling large elections that overcomes the “paradox
of voting” in a costly voting framework, without reliance on the assumption of ad hoc preferences
for voting. The key innovation that we propose is the adoption of a “smooth” policy rule under which
the degree to which parties favor their own interests is increasing in their margin of victory. In other
words, mandates matter. We argue that this approach is an improvement over the existing literature
as it is consistent with the empirical evidence. Incorporating this policy rule into a costly voting model
with paternalistic voters yields a parsimonious model with attractive properties.  Specifically, the model
predicts that when the size of the electorate grows without bound, limiting turnout is strictly positive
both in terms of numbers and proportions.  Further, the model preserves the typical comparative statics
predictions that have been identified in the extant costly voting models such as the underdog effect
and the competition effect. Finally, under the case of selfish agents, we are able to extend Palfrey and
Rosenthal’s (1985) zero turnout result to a general class of smooth policy rules.  Thus, this new approach
reconciles the predictions of standard costly voting, both in terms of positive turnout and comparative
statics predictions with the assumption of a large electorate environment.
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Smooth Politicians and Paternalistic Voters: 
A Theory of Large Elections 
 
1. Introduction 
In the original formulation of his rational choice theory, Anthony Downs (1957) drew attention 
to what has come to be known as the “paradox of voting”: if voting is costly, turnout in large 
elections should be negligible. Downs formulated the problem in a decision theoretic framework, 
relying on the fact that the probability of being pivotal is exogenous. Ledyard (1981, 1984) and 
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985) questioned the validity of this approach and recast the 
problem in game theoretic terms. As a result of these efforts, in their 1985 paper, Palfrey and 
Rosenthal demonstrated that in large electorates, provided uncertainty about relative costs, voters 
with positive net voting costs abstain even in a game theoretic framework: “We have come full 
circle and are once again beset by the paradox of not voting.”
1 (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985, p. 
64). In spite of this paradox, game theoretic costly voting models have been, and continue to be, 
prominent (see, for instance, Campbell, 1999; Börgers, 2004; Goeree and Grosser, 2007; Krasa 
and Polborn, 2009; Krishna and Morgan, 2010; Taylor and Yildirim 2010, among others). Their 
popularity is driven by two factors: first, these models are consistent with the notion that voters 
behave strategically (e.g. Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Franklin et al., 1994); second, they are 
able to generate intuitive, and empirically supported, comparative statics predictions (e.g. 
Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999; Blais, 2000; Levine and Palfrey, 2007) – at least with a finite 
electorate. 
To date, the prediction that turnout converges to zero as the size of the electorate grows has 
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typically been overcome in the costly voting model through the incorporation of either ad hoc 
preferences for voting or coordination mechanisms that lack a solid micro-foundation (see for 
instance Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Harsanyi, 1977, 1992; Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006; 
Coate and Conlin, 2004 ). We instead propose a new approach to modeling large elections that 
overcomes this paradox in a costly voting framework, without reliance on the assumption of 
direct psychic rewards from casting one’s ballot.  
We consider a two-party system. Citizens are characterized by their political preference and cost 
of voting, both being private information. We modify the standard model in two ways. First, we 
drop the usual winner-take-all assumption and instead include a “smooth” policy rule under 
which the degree to which parties (or elected officials) favor their own party’s interests is 
increasing in their margin of victory.  In other words, mandates matter.  Specifically, we assume 
that the benefit from government action is distributed across members of the two parties 
according to a continuous function that is strictly increasing (tilted toward members of the 
winning party) in the proportion of votes received by the winning party. Thus, politicians are 
“smooth” in the sense that, for members of a given party, benefits are strictly increasing in the 
vote percentage received by said party.  
Second, following in the tradition of recent work by Feddersen and Sandroni (2006), we assume 
that voters are paternalistic. Citizens not only receive a private benefit from having their 
preferred policies adopted, but they also receive spillover benefits from the impact that these 
policies have on other individuals.  
To motivate our assumption about smooth politicians, we first argue that this is a logical 
expectation in an environment where candidates serve at the will of their electorate.  We 
additionally provide empirical evidence of this type of behavior in the U.S. Congress.  In 5 
 
particular, we use a panel data model with member and Congress fixed effects to demonstrate 
that the degree to which members of congress adopt partisan voting records is increasing in the 
margin of victory in their most recent election.   
Using our proposed theoretical framework we show that, when the size of the electorate grows 
without bound, limiting turnout is strictly positive (in terms of proportion) if the supporters of 
both parties are paternalistic. This relies critically on the assumption that mandates matter. 
Indeed, we show that if the election is decided by winner-take-all majority rule, turnout still 
converges to zero even if voters are paternalistic. The intuition is as follows.  For a paternalistic 
individual in a winner-take-all election, while the benefit from voting increases with the size of 
the population, her probability of being pivotal goes to zero at an even faster rate. While, under 
the marriage of paternalism and a smooth policy function, the rate at which policy impact 
decreases with population is such that it is precisely offset by the increase in paternalistic 
benefits arising from the increase in the population. Conversely, when we relax the paternalism 
assumption and assume that the supporters of at least one party are purely selfish, we are able to 
extend Palfrey and Rosenthal’s (1985) famous zero turnout result to a general class of smooth 
policy rules. Thus, we require both paternalism and the assumption that mandates matter to 
overcome the paradox of voting.  
In analyzing the comparative statics properties of our model, we distinguish between two 
different types of paternalism: Exclusive and Inclusive Paternalism. While Exclusive agents are 
solely concerned about members of their own party, Inclusive voters also care about the 
supporters of the other party.   Under this dichotomy, our framework allows us to discern 
between two competing comparative statics effects associated with the relative size of the two 
parties. On the one hand, increasing the size of one party makes its supporters less likely to vote 6 
 
(the well-known free-riding effect). On the other hand, changing the relative composition of the 
electorate varies the spillovers received by a voter. We refer to this second channel of impact as 
the spillover effect. While free-riding and spillover effects perfectly offset each other in the case 
of Exclusive voters, the latter is less pronounced when voters are Inclusive. As a consequence, 
when agents display Inclusive Paternalism, under the assumption of identical cost distributions 
and identical overall levels of paternalism, the incentive to free-ride leads members of the 
minority party to turn out to vote at higher rates than do the majority (the so-called underdog 
effect -- see Levine and Palfrey, 2007); nevertheless, the majority never loses its initial advantage 
and receives a higher share of the votes.  Furthermore, assuming the same cost distribution for 
both parties and symmetric paternalism, the model generates the prediction that the closer the 
election the higher turnout (the so-called competition effect--see Levine and Palfrey, 2007).  Both 
the underdog and competition effects have been well documented empirically (see, for instance, 
Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999; Blais, 2000; Levine and Palfrey, 2007) and characterized as 
theoretical features of standard costly voting models with finite electorate and identical cost 
distributions (see Taylor and Yildirim, 2010).  Key however, as shown by Taylor and Yildirim 
(2010), is the fact that these effects disappear when the electorate size grows without bound.  
Thus, a main contribution of our approach is its ability to reconcile the attractive properties of 
standard costly voting models of small elections with the assumption of a large electorate 
environment. 
 
2. Background and Motivation 
The first attempt to solve the paradox of voting in costly elections relied on the assumption that 
citizens receive a direct benefit from voting that is independent of the election outcome.  When 7 
 
this benefit exceeds the cost of voting (𝐷 > 𝑐) citizens vote (see Riker and Ordeshook, 1968).  
While overcoming the problem of zero turnout, this model abstracts from strategic interactions 
and provides no comparative statics predictions regarding voter turnout.  Other scholars 
approached the problem from a different perspective, assuming instead that leaders can mobilize 
party supporters (e.g. Morton, 1991; Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999). As a consequence, the game 
becomes one with a small number of players and equilibrium turnout is positive. Although they 
are able to provide comparative statics results, such models do not provide a micro-foundation to 
explain how leaders mobilize followers. 
More recently, following in the tradition of Riker and Ordeshook’s civic duty model, Feddersen 
and Sandroni (2006) develop a model of ethical voters in the spirit of Harsanyi’s (1977) rule 
utilitarian framework. Under their specification, the exogenously given voting rule of Riker and 
Ordeshook is replaced by an endogenously determined group-specific utilitarian voting rule that 
accounts for the benefits and voting costs of all individuals.  
In the model of Feddersen and Sandroni, within each of two types (parties) there are two kinds of 
agents: ethical voters and abstainers, with the latter abstaining under all circumstances.  Ethical 
voters on the other hand receive a benefit D greater than the maximum voting cost 𝑐̅ for “doing 
their part”, where “doing their part” consists of following the threshold voting strategy that 
would be adopted by a social planner maximizing a utilitarian social welfare function.  The 
social planner’s objective function adopted by a given type (party) puts equal weight on the 
benefits and voting costs of members of each type (party). Hence, ethical voters exhibit other-
regarding preferences: while they are altruistic with regards to other voters’ costs, their 
specification is paternalistic in that an individual of a given type projects her own preferred 
election outcome onto the entire measure of voters.  8 
 
Feddersen and Sandroni’s model provides a strong set of comparative statics predictions and 
represents a major step forward in the quest for an appropriate theory of large elections. A 
version of their specification is also used by Coate and Conlin (2004) to explain turnout in Texas 
liquor referenda. Nevertheless, the model relies on the assumption that ethical voters of a given 
group do not interact strategically among themselves and, for this reason, the game is actually 
isomorphic to a two-player game. This leaves open the question of how ethical voters of the 
same type can coordinate and behave as a single actor, instead of free-riding on each other. 
While there exists ample evidence that individuals exhibit other-regarding preferences (see, for 
instance, Fehr and Schmidt, 2006), and such assumptions are typically employed to explain why 
agents cooperate in prisoner’s dilemma problems, the (group) rule utilitarian approach is non-
standard outside Harsanyi’s and Feddersen and Sandroni’s specifications and lacks empirical 
support. Moreover, the model crucially depends on the assumption that (at least some) ethical 
voters care about the social cost of the election. If this was not the case, all ethical voters would 
turn out to vote, as already predicted in Riker and Ordeshook. While this assumption makes 
sense from the social planner’s perspective it is not clear why this is an accurate description of a 
strategic voter’s preference. 
Most recently, in a current working paper, Evren (2011) shows how the rule utilitarian 
assumption of Feddersen and Sandroni’s model can be relaxed when there is uncertainty over the 
proportion of other-regarding voters. In doing so, he is able to replicate Feddersen and 
Sandroni’s results in a game theoretic framework.  
In this paper we take a different approach to the problem. Building on the classic work of Palfrey 
and Rosenthal (1985), we extend their specification to include the paternalistic behavior posited 
by those working in the tradition of Feddersen and Sandroni.  Additionally, critical to our 9 
 
approach is the assumption that mandates matter and election outcomes are mapped into policy 
decisions through a smooth policy function that is continuous in election margins (smooth 
politicians).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We begin, in Section 3, with the case for 
replacing traditional winner-take-all models of election outcomes with our proposed smooth 
policy approach.  In Section 4, assuming smooth politicians, we construct a parsimonious and 
tractable model that yields positive turnout when voters are paternalistic, while we extend 
Palfrey and Rosenthal’s (1985) zero turnout result to a general class of smooth policy rules when 
the supporters of at least one party are purely selfish. Section 5 provides comparative statics 
predictions: we show that, under the assumption of identical cost distributions, our model 
generates both the underdog effect and the competition effect. Section 6 concludes. 
  
3. Smooth Politicians: Empirical Evidence 
The key innovation of our modeling approach is the incorporation of a smooth policy rule under 
which the degree of partisanship following an election is a continuous function of the relative 
vote shares of the two parties.  Here we argue that elections determine not only who gets elected, 
but also what kind of policies the winners will enact.  The basic reasoning is that candidates who 
win by larger margins are likely to adopt more partisan policies than are candidates who win by 
small margins.  
Several arguments exist to support this type of behavior and have received attention in the 
political science literature.
2  For example, candidates who win by a landslide can claim they have 
a mandate for their party’s policies while those who win by small margins cannot claim such a 
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mandate.  Additionally, when elections are repeated games and candidates are uncertain about 
the distribution of voter preferences, close elections may cause candidates to eschew highly 
partisan policies to avoid the risk of losing the next election to a more moderate candidate.  
Finally, candidates may be intrinsically motivated to legislate from the center of their electorate.  
In this case, close elections signal a moderate electoral center while large margins signal a more 
partisan electoral center. 
A number of studies have provided empirical support for the link between margin of victory and 
policy outcomes. Examples include work by Fowler (2005), Somer-Topcu (2009) and  Peterson 
et al. (2003).  Fowler (2005) finds that in U.S. Senate races candidates respond to increases in the 
previous election’s Republican vote by adopting more conservative positions in the current race.  
Somer-Topcu (2009), using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project to evaluate the impact 
of election outcomes on party policy positions in a sample of 23 Democracies between 1945 and 
1998, finds that parties respond to declining vote shares by changing the policies they support.  
Finally, Peterson et al. (2003) analyze newspaper coverage to identify U.S. Presidential and off-
year elections that were perceived as providing a “mandate” to the winning party.  They then 
provide empirical evidence that, following a “mandate” election, members of congress deviate 
from their historical voting pattern in the direction of the mandate – with this effect attenuating 
over time. 
While this extant literature is suggestive of smooth behavior by politicians, more direct evidence 
can be obtained through an analysis of congressional voting behavior.  Table 1 provides an 
analysis of the impact of margin of victory on the voting behavior of U.S. Members of Congress 
for the 105
th through 111
th Congress. For a given Member of Congress in a given year, we 
identify their degree of partisanship using the first dimension of Poole and Rosenthal’s well-11 
 
known DW-Nominate Score.
3  This component of the DW-Nominate Score provides a one 
dimensional ranking on the liberal-conservative axis for each Member of Congress in each 
Congressional Session – based on an analysis of all roll-call votes during each session.  For a 
given Congressperson in a given year, we measure degree of partisanship as the distance 
between that Representative’s D-Nominate Score and the “center” which we identify as the 
midpoint between the scores of the most liberal Republican and the most conservative Democrat.  
The first seven columns of Table 1 report the results from a regression of degree of partisanship 
on Margin of victory and years in office for each of seven sessions of Congress – with the eighth 
column presenting repeated cross-sectional results that are pooled across all seven Congresses.  
The final row of the table reports the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in 
margin of victory on the level of partisanship, expressed in terms of standard deviations in 
partisanship.  For example for the 105
th Congress, the model predicts that a one standard 
deviation increase in margin of victory will be associated with a .2 standard deviation increase in 
partisanship.  The estimated marginal effect is highly significant for all seven congresses and 
ranges between .11 and .44 – with a pooled estimate of .25. 
Of course, these results do not necessarily imply a direct causal link.  One reasonable possibility 
is that they reflect the selection of more ideologically extreme candidates into districts with 
larger partisan majorities. However, if these results are solely driven by candidate selection, 
given that election outcomes are the most direct measure of a given district’s voter ideology, 
voters would still benefit by increasing their candidate’s margin of victory (decreasing 
                                                           
3 See Poole and Rosenthal (2001) for a discussion of the construction of their D-W Nominate Score. A complete set 
of scores for the 1
st through 111
th Congress are available online at: http://pooleandrosenthal.com/dwnominate.asp.  
In the current work we restrict our analysis to the 105
th thru the 111
th congress because of limitations in the 
availability of digitized data and the difficulty in constructing panel data that accounts for re-districting in earlier 
periods. 12 
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their candidate’s loss margin) because the selection mechanism would in the long-run lead to 
preferred policy outcomes.  While such a direct causal link is not necessary to motivate the 
assumption of smooth politicians, it is possible to use the panel nature of the congressional data 
to test for a more causal link.  Specifically, by pooling the data and including candidate and 
congress fixed effects, we can more directly evaluate the way that the voting behavior of a given 
candidate evolves over time in response to changes in their margin of victory.  The final column 
of Table 1 reports the results from this analysis.  Again, margin of victory is highly significant, 
and the estimated marginal effect is .12.  Thus, even when we focus solely on the within 
candidate variation in ideological voting patterns, there is clear evidence in support of the 
smooth politician assumption. 
To incorporate the notion of smooth politicians in the context of a costly voting model, we 
assume that policy outcomes can be mapped to the interval (0,1).  Members of party A strictly 
prefer outcomes closer to 0 and members of party B strictly prefer outcomes closer to 1.  
Election outcomes (expressed as the proportion voting for party B) are mapped into policy 
outcomes via a policy function 𝐺(∙). The only restrictions on the policy function are that it be 
strictly increasing in the proportion of votes for party B and that there is symmetric treatment of 
the two parties.
4  This specification provides a great deal of flexibility; as is shown in Figure 1, 
which presents 3 different possible policy functions.  The solid line presents a “proportional” 
policy function which is consistent with the proportional representation rules that operate in 
many parliamentary democracies.  The dashed line represents a “quasi-majority” policy function 
which approximates policy outcomes under direct election regimes such as those that operate in 
the U.S. Congress.  Our model allows such a “quasi-majority” policy function to be arbitrarily 
                                                           
4 We formalize these notions below in Section 4. 14 
 
close to the type of step function that characterizes the winner-take-all assumption that has been 
typical in costly voting models.   
Figure 1. 
 
Lastly, the dotted line represents an “un-conventional” policy rule that, while likely of little 
empirical relevance, is still admitted by the model. 
We conclude this section by noting that our goal is not to provide a theoretical treatment that 
explains why politicians are smooth but rather we seek to show how incorporating this type 
observed behavior into the costly voting framework yields attractive theoretical results.   
 
4. The Model 
We consider a model of costly voting with two parties:        . Society is composed of       15 
 
citizens. Each individual has the same ex ante independent probability 𝜆 ∈ (0,1) of being a 
supporter of party 𝐴 and 1 − 𝜆 of supporting party 𝐵. Citizens decide simultaneously whether to 
vote or to abstain. If they decide to participate in the election they bear a cost. We assume that 
for a generic individual 𝑖, supporter of party 𝑃, there is a cost to voting 𝑐𝑖∈𝑃 ∈ �𝑐𝑃,𝑐𝑃� ⊂ ℝ+. 
Members of party 𝑃 draw their voting costs independently from the differentiable distribution 
𝐹𝑃(𝑐𝑃), with 𝐹𝑃
′(𝑐𝑃) > 0 on the entire support. While 𝜆, 𝐹 𝐴 and 𝐹𝐵 are common knowledge, 
each citizen’s preference and cost to voting are private information. If at least one individual 
votes, then each member of party 𝑃 receives a benefit from government action according to the 
electoral rule 𝐺:[0,1] → [0,1], which is a function of the proportion of total votes 𝑧𝑃 obtained 
by party 𝑃. We assume 𝐺′(𝑧𝑃) > 0 and finite, 𝐺(0) = 0, 𝐺(1) = 1 and 𝐺(𝑧𝑃) = 1 − 𝐺(1 −
𝑧𝑃). This last assumption is an anonymity condition that guarantees symmetric treatment of the 




Individuals receive direct benefits from government allocations, but they also exhibit 
paternalism. They receive spillovers from the benefits obtained by the other members of their 
party and may enjoy positive utility from each member of the other party being subject to their 
own party’s policy. If a supporter of party 𝑃 receives a direct benefit 𝑏 from government action, 
she enjoys an additional benefit equal to 𝗾𝑃
𝑃𝑏 for each member of her own party, and a benefit 
𝗾𝑃
𝑃 �𝑏 for every supporter of the alternative party. We assume that 𝗾𝑃
𝑃 and 𝗾𝑃
𝑃 � are common 
knowledge and that 𝗾𝑃
𝑃,𝗾𝑃
𝑃 � ≥ 0. 
Consider individual 𝑖, with cost 𝑐𝑖, belonging to party 𝑃. Let 𝑁𝑃 and 𝑉𝑃 be the number of 
supporters of party 𝑃 and of votes cast for 𝑃, both exclusive of individual 𝑖, respectively. 16 
 
Moreover, call 𝑉𝑃 � the number of votes cast for the other party. Notice that for a supporter of 
party 𝑃 voting for the other party is dominated by abstaining, hence citizens' actions boil down to 
abstain or vote for their preferred alternative. If individual 𝑖 decides to abstain her benefit is 
given by: 
�1 + 𝑁𝑃𝗾𝑃








𝑃 + (𝑁 − 𝑁𝑃)𝗾𝑃
𝑃 ��      if 𝑉𝑃 + 𝑉𝑃 � = 0.  
If 𝑖 decides to vote, she receives a gross benefit equal to: 
 �1 + 𝑁𝑃𝗾𝑃
𝑃 + (𝑁 − 𝑁𝑃)𝗾𝑃
𝑃 ��𝐺 �
𝑉𝑃+1
𝑉𝑃+𝑉𝑃 �+1�   if 𝑉𝑃 + 𝑉𝑃 � > 0, and  
1 + 𝑁𝑃𝗾𝑃
𝑃 + (𝑁 − 𝑁𝑃)𝗾𝑃
𝑃 �       if 𝑉𝑃 + 𝑉𝑃 � = 0,  





𝑃 + (𝑁 − 𝑁𝑃)𝗾𝑃
𝑃 ���𝐺 �
𝑉𝑃 + 1
𝑉𝑃 + 𝑉𝑃 � + 1
� − 𝐺 �
𝑉𝑃
𝑉𝑃 + 𝑉𝑃 �




𝑃 + (𝑁 − 𝑁𝑃)𝗾𝑃
𝑃 �� − 𝑐𝑖                                                              𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑃 + 𝑉𝑃 � = 0
. 
The solution concept that we employ is Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (BNE). As it is customary in 
this literature, we restrict our attention to type-symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibria, in the sense 
that all citizens supporting the same alternative choose the same strategy. In turn, participation 
decisions depend on the realization of the individual voting cost. Formally, a strategy is a 
mapping 𝑠𝑃:�𝑐𝑃,𝑐𝑃� → {0,1}, where 𝑠𝑃(𝑐𝑖) = 0 means that individual i supporting party 𝑃 
abstains and votes otherwise. A strategy profile {𝑠𝐴,𝑠𝐵} is a type-symmetric BNE of the game if 
𝑠𝑃(𝑐𝑖) maximizes every individual’s expected payoff, given that all other individuals adhere to 
𝑠𝑃.  
We start by exploring voters’ behavior when 𝑁 + 1 is finite. It is possible to characterize 17 
 
citizens’ strategies through cut-off values 𝑐𝑃
∗ such that 
       𝑠𝑃(𝑐𝑖) = �
1       𝑖𝑓𝑐𝑖 ≤ 𝑐𝑃
∗ 
0       𝑖𝑓𝑐𝑖 > 𝑐𝑃
∗ .                                                          (1) 
 
Proposition 1 There exists a pure strategy type-symmetric BNE characterized by the voting 





Having characterized the equilibrium for 𝑁 + 1 finite, we now turn to analyze voters’ behavior 
in large elections. In order to do this we need to introduce some extra notation. First of all, call 
𝜈𝐴 ≥ 0 the probability that an 𝐴-supporter votes in the election. Equally, 𝜈𝐵 ≥ 0 is the 
probability that a member of party 𝐵 votes. Moreover, given individual 𝑖, let 𝜆 ̂ and �1 − 𝜆 ̂� be 
the realized proportions of the electorate, exclusive of 𝑖, that support party 𝐴 and 𝐵, respectively. 
Finally, denote by 𝜈̂𝐴 and 𝜈̂𝐵 the realized proportions of the electorate, exclusive of 𝑖, that vote 
for party 𝐴 and 𝐵, respectively. For simplicity of notation let us define Γ 𝐴 = 𝗾𝐴
𝐴𝜆  + 𝗾𝐴
𝐵(1 − 𝜆) 
and Γ �𝐴 = 𝗾𝐴
𝐴𝜆 ̂ + 𝗾𝐴
𝐵�1 − 𝜆 ̂�. Similarly, for a 𝐵-supporter, Γ𝐵 = 𝗾𝐵
𝐴𝜆 + 𝗾𝐵
𝐵(1 − 𝜆) and Γ �𝐵 =
𝗾𝐵
𝐴𝜆 ̂ + 𝗾𝐵
𝐵�1 − 𝜆 ̂�.  
With no loss of generality, consider a supporter of party 𝐴. Given a sample of size 𝑁 + 1, 
conditional on the decisions of all other individuals, the expected gross benefit from voting for 
an 𝐴-supporter is given by Equation (2). 
𝐸[𝐵𝐴] =  𝐸 ��1 + 𝑁Γ �𝐴��𝐺 �
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �𝑁+1
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �𝑁+𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 ��𝑁+1� − 𝐺 �
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �+𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 �����𝜈̂𝐴𝜆 ̂𝑁 + 𝜈̂𝐵�1 − 𝜆 ̂�𝑁 > 0� ∗
𝑃�𝜈̂𝐴𝜆 ̂𝑁 + 𝜈̂𝐵�1 − 𝜆 ̂�𝑁 > 0� + 𝐸 �
1
2�1 + 𝑁Γ �𝐴��𝜈̂𝐴𝜆 ̂𝑁 + 𝜈̂𝐵�1 − 𝜆 ̂�𝑁 = 0� ∗ 𝑃�𝜈̂𝐴𝜆 ̂𝑁 +
                                                           
5 The proofs of all propositions, corollaries, and lemmas are provided in the Appendix. 18 
 
𝜈̂𝐵�1 − 𝜆 ̂�𝑁 = 0�.                                                                                                                         (2) 
Notice that the expectation in equation (2) is taken over the random variables 𝜆 ̂, 𝜈̂𝐴 and 𝜈̂𝐵. Next, 





and 𝑁�𝜈𝐵(1 − 𝜆),
𝜈𝐵(1−𝜆)[1−𝜈𝐵(1−𝜆)]
𝑁 �, respectively. As a result we have 𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜆 ̂ = 𝜆, 𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜈̂𝐴𝜆 ̂ =
𝜈𝐴𝜆 and 𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜈̂𝐵�1 − 𝜆 ̂� = 𝜈𝐵(1 − 𝜆). Hence, supposing an equilibrium characterized by 
thresholds 𝑐𝐴
∗ and 𝑐𝐵
∗, limiting turnout in equilibrium is equal 𝜆𝐹 𝐴(𝑐𝐴
∗) + (1 − 𝜆)𝐹𝐵(𝑐𝐵
∗). 
The following proposition summarizes the main result of the paper. 
 
Proposition 2 When 𝑁 → ∞, limiting turnout is positive if and only if Γ 𝐴 > 0 and Γ𝐵 > 0. 
In the case where  Γ 𝐴,Γ𝐵 > 0 the expected gross benefit from voting for an A-member and a B-
member is given respectively by: 

























∗ > 𝑐𝐵.  
Conversely, if Γ 𝐴 = Γ𝐵 = 0, 𝑐𝐴 ≥
1
2 and 𝑐𝐵 ≥
1
2 then turnout is equal to zero. Finally, in all other 
cases, turnout for both parties converges to zero. 
 
Proposition 2 states that, if both groups are paternalistic, equilibrium turnout is strictly positive 


























∗)(1−𝜆)� vote in equilibrium. Crucially, this result 19 
 
does not depend on the values of 𝑐𝐴 and 𝑐𝐵. The intuition behind this finding is that, although the 
weight of an individual vote becomes negligible as 𝑁 tends to infinity, the benefit grows with the 
size of the electorate.  
If all agents are selfish, Proposition 2 extends Palfrey and Rosenthal’s (1985) zero turnout result 
to a general class of smooth policy rules. Indeed, when everyone is selfish our model predicts 
that turnout is either zero, if 𝑐𝐴,𝑐𝐵 ≥
1
2, or converges to zero otherwise. Finally, turnout tends to 
zero if the supporters of only one party are paternalistic; since selfish players will abstain, there 
cannot be a mass of paternalistic voters casting a ballot in equilibrium. 
One extension to this result is Corollary 1 which states that, ceteris paribus, limiting turnout in 
equilibrium can be arbitrarily high if voters are sufficiently paternalistic.  
 
Corollary 1 Given 𝐺(∙) and 𝜆, there exists a pair (Γ �𝐴,Γ �𝐵) such that 𝑐𝐴
∗ = 𝑐𝐴 and 𝑐𝐵
∗ = 𝑐𝐵 for any 
(Γ 𝐴,Γ𝐵) with Γ 𝐴 ≥ Γ �𝐴 and Γ𝐵 ≥ Γ �𝐵. Given 𝐺(∙), 𝜆 and Γ𝑃 > 0 there exists Γ �𝑃 such that 𝑐𝑃
∗ = 𝑐𝑃 ∀ 
Γ𝑃 ≥ Γ �𝑃. 
 
5. Equilibrium Analysis: Exclusive vs Inclusive Paternalism 
We now focus on large elections where limiting turnout is positive, that is ΓA,ΓB > 0. We 
consider two different types of paternalistic voters. If members of party 𝑃 are such that 𝗾𝑃
𝑃 > 0, 
while 𝗾𝑃
𝑃 = 0, we will say that they are Exclusive, as they only care about the members of their 
own party. On the other hand, we will call them Inclusive if 𝗾𝑃
𝑃,𝗾𝑃
𝑃 > 0. We limit our analysis to 20 
 
the cases where all citizens are either Exclusive or Inclusive.
6 We begin by presenting the 
following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1  






𝜕𝜆 = 0, and thus: 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛�
𝜕𝑐𝐴
∗
𝜕𝜆 � = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛�
𝜕𝑐𝐵
∗
𝜕𝜆 � .  






𝜕𝜆 < 0, and thus it cannot be the case that both 
𝜕𝑐𝐴
∗
𝜕𝜆 > 0 and 
𝜕𝑐𝐵
∗
𝜕𝜆 < 0.  
 
Lemma 1 is instructive, as it illustrates the two effects of a marginal change in 𝜆. On the one 
hand we have the well-known free-riding effect: increasing 𝜆 makes A-members less likely to 
vote, while inducing 𝐵-supporters to vote more often. On the other hand, by changing the 
composition of the electorate, an increase in 𝜆 varies the spillovers received by a voter. We call 
this relationship the spillover effect. 
Suppose that voters are Exclusive. An increase in 𝜆 produces a positive spillover effect for 𝐴-
supporters, and a negative one for members of party 𝐵. Spillover and free-riding effect perfectly 






∗) is unchanged. As a consequence, the 
equilibrium thresholds for the two parties move in the same direction. If voters are Inclusive the 
spillover effect is less pronounced. Following an increase in 𝜆, an 𝐴-supporter receives higher 
                                                           
6 Given some additional conditions, most results also hold when the supporters of one party are Exclusive, while the 
members of the other party are Inclusive. However, the study of the “mixed” case would complicate the analysis 
without adding any interesting insights. Similarly, the key results do not greatly change if 𝗾𝑃
𝑃 � > 0, but 𝗾𝑃
𝑃 = 0, that 
is when voters only care about the supporters of the opposite party. Nevertheless, we do not analyze this case, as it is 
not particularly realistic.     
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spillovers from members of her own party, but lower spillovers from 𝐵-members. The opposite 






∗) decreases with 𝜆, implying that the 
equilibrium threshold for party 𝐴 cannot increase while the equilibrium threshold for 𝐵 
decreases. 
Lemma 1 allows us to establish the following result. 
 
Proposition 3 










𝐵, lim𝜆→0 𝐹 𝐴(𝑐𝐴
∗) = 0, lim𝜆→0 𝐹𝐵(𝑐𝐵
∗) = 0, 
lim𝜆→1 𝐹 𝐴(𝑐𝐴
∗) = 0 and lim𝜆→1 𝐹𝐵(𝑐𝐵
∗) = 0. 
ii.  If voters are Inclusive then lim𝜆→0 𝐹 𝐴(𝑐𝐴
∗) = 1 and lim𝜆→0 𝐹𝐵(𝑐𝐵
∗) = 0, while 
lim𝜆→1 𝐹 𝐴(𝑐𝐴
∗) = 0 and lim𝜆→1 𝐹𝐵(𝑐𝐵
∗) = 1. 
 
Thus, under Exclusive Paternalism, the free-riding effect is offset by the spillover effect and voter 
turnout goes to zero as 𝜆 goes to zero.  Conversely, under Inclusive Paternalism, the free-riding 
effect dominates and as 𝜆 goes to zero, minority turnout goes to 100% and majority turnout goes 
to zero. 
 
5.1 Identical Cost Distributions 
In the remainder of the paper we focus on the case where all citizens draw their costs from the 
same cost distribution, i.e. we assume 𝐹 𝐴 = 𝐹𝐵 = 𝐹.  Proposition 4 establishes that if voters are 
Exclusive the group with the higher degree of paternalism will always vote more often than the 





Proposition 4 Suppose Exclusive voters and 𝐹 𝐴 = 𝐹𝐵. 
















On the other hand, Proposition 5 demonstrates that if voters are Inclusive, there exists a critical 
value 𝜆 ̃ such that 𝐴-supporters vote more often than 𝐵-supporters for any 𝜆 < 𝜆 ̃, while the 
opposite is true when 𝜆 > 𝜆 ̃. 
 
Proposition 5 (Underdog Effect) Suppose Inclusive voters and 𝐹 𝐴 = 𝐹𝐵. There exists 𝜆 ̃ such 
that 𝑐𝐴
∗(𝜆) > 𝑐𝐵
∗(𝜆)∀𝜆 < 𝜆 ̃, 𝑐𝐴
∗(𝜆) < 𝑐𝐵
∗(𝜆)∀𝜆 > 𝜆 ̃ and 𝑐𝐴
∗�𝜆 ̃� = 𝑐𝐵
∗�𝜆 ̃�. 




𝐵 then 𝜆 ̃ =
1
2 (Pure Underdog Effect). 




𝐵 then 𝜆 ̃ >
1
2 (Asymmetric Underdog Effect). 




𝐵 then 𝜆 ̃ <
1
2 (Asymmetric Underdog Effect). 
 
The value of 𝜆 ̃ depends on the relative degree of paternalism of the two groups. If both groups 
exhibit the same overall level of Inclusive paternalism then 𝜆 ̃ =
1
2, meaning that the minority 
supporters vote with a strictly higher probability than do the members of the majority party. This 23 
 
phenomenon, called underdog effect
7, has been discussed in several papers and has been 
formalized in a general framework by Taylor and Yildirim (2010) for the case of small electorate 
and same cost distribution. Crucially, in Taylor and Yildirim’s model the underdog effect 
disappears when 𝑁 → ∞, as turnout converges to zero.  
The underdog effect is caused by the relatively higher incentive to free-ride experienced by the 
majority supporters. This is why it arises only when voters are Inclusive. As shown in Lemma 1, 
if voters are Exclusive the spillover effect is sufficiently strong to offset the free-riding effect, 
and the equilibrium thresholds of the two groups move in the same direction when 𝜆 changes. 
Moreover, notice that the underdog effect can only arise if both groups display the same overall 




𝐵. If that is not the case, the game is no longer 
symmetric, implying that one group votes with a strictly higher probability when the electorate is 
evenly split. Hence, the switching point 𝜆 ̃ cannot be equal to 
1
2. Thus, we draw a distinction 
between a pure underdog effect and an asymmetric underdog effect. 
When both groups are characterized by the same overall level of paternalism, despite the 
underdog effect, the majority supporters never lose their initial advantage, provided that 
individuals care about their fellow group members at least as much as do those supporting the 
alternative party. As shown by Taylor and Yildirim (2010) for the small electorate case, in 
equilibrium the majority party receives a higher share of the votes. As we prove in the next 







∗) as the 
                                                           
7 The term underdog effect  was introduced by Levine and Palfrey (2007), who document it with experimental 
evidence. Shachar and Nalebuff (1999) and Blais (2000), among others, provide empirical evidence for the case of 
large elections. 
8 Supposing that an individual is at least as much concerned for her own group as is a member of the other party is a 
realistic, and not very restrictive, assumption. Moreover, by definition, it is always true for Exclusive voters.   24 
 
share of the votes cast for party 𝐴 in equilibrium. 
 





















Another important phenomenon that has received significant attention in the voting literature is 
the so-called competition effect, which states that turnout is higher the closer is the election. 
Levine and Palfrey (2007), who coined the term competition effect, provide evidence for it from 
laboratory experiments. This has been a difficult property to demonstrate in models of large 
elections (see Krasa and Polborn, 2009). Indeed, as reported by Taylor and Yildirim “the widely 
held intuition that elections with a more evenly split electorate should generate a greater 
expected turnout appears to be a property of small elections” (Taylor and Yildirim, 2010, p. 
464). Nevertheless, the reason why their model does not predict higher turnout in closer elections 
is because in a standard costly voting framework turnout tends to zero as 𝑁 → ∞. Yet, the 
competition effect is well documented in large elections (see, for example, Blais, 2000; Shachar 
and Nalebuff, 1999). 
In Proposition 7 we provide analytical evidence of the competition effect for the case of 
Exclusive voters, provided the following two conditions hold: 𝗾𝐴
𝐴 = 𝗾𝐵
𝐵 and 𝐺′′(𝑧𝑃) ≥ 0 for 
𝑧𝑃 <
1
2 (implying 𝐺′′(𝑧𝑃) ≤ 0 when 𝑧𝑃 >
1
2). Both conditions are rather weak and intuitive. 
Firstly, if 𝗾𝐴
𝐴 ≠ 𝗾𝐵
𝐵 the game is asymmetric and turnout for the two parties is not the same when 
𝜆 =
1
2: hence a more evenly split electorate does not imply a closer election. Second, notice that 
so far we have not made any restrictions on the shape of the function 𝐺(𝑧𝑃). If 𝐺′′(𝑧𝑃) is greater 25 
 
than (or equal to) zero for 𝑧𝑃 <
1
2, an individual vote has more (or equal) weight, and the benefit 
from voting is greater (or equal), when it closes the gap with the other party than when it 
increases it. This assumption encompasses both the proportional and quasi-majority policy rules 
discussed above in Section 3. 
 
Proposition 7 (Competition Effect) Suppose Exclusive voters and 𝐹 𝐴 = 𝐹𝐵. If 𝗾𝐴
𝐴 = 𝗾𝐵
𝐵 and 
𝐺′′(𝑧𝑃) ≥ 0 for 𝑧𝑃 <
1




We can only provide an analytical proof for the case of Exclusive voters.  However, in our model 





𝐴 and 𝐺′′(𝑧𝑃) ≥ 0 for 𝑧𝑃 <
1
2.  Figures 2 and 3 illustrate predicted turnout as a 
function of 𝜆 for a proportional policy rule and a quasi-majority policy rule, respectively. In both 
examples, 𝗾𝐴
𝐴 = 𝗾𝐵
𝐵 = 0.5, 𝗾𝐴
𝐵 = 𝗾𝐵
𝐴 = 0.25 and costs are uniformly distributed. 𝐺(𝑧𝑃)= 𝑧𝑃 in 
Figure 2, while in Figure 3 𝐺(𝑧𝑃)=2 𝑧𝑃




                             Figure 2.                                                               Figure 3. 
While, we only present two examples here, an exhaustive search over specifications satisfying 





















𝐴 and 𝐺′′(𝑧𝑃) ≥ 0 for 𝑧𝑃 <
1
2  has failed to yield a counter-
example. 
Propositions 2 thru 7 and their associated lemmas and corollaries serve to highlight the large 
election properties of a costly voting model that incorporates paternalism (Exclusive and 
Inclusive) and smooth politicians – the key strength of the model being its ability to overcome 
the paradox of voting, and to capture free-riding and spillover effects, the underdog effect, and 
the competition effect in a purely game theoretic formulation of a large election.  
As we showed in Proposition 2, if voters are selfish our model predicts that turnout converges to 
zero, even assuming that mandate matters. Although we argue that a smooth policy rule is a 
much more realistic assumption than considering elections as winner-take-all, it is a fair question 
to ask what would happen if voters were paternalistic, but the outcome of the election was 
decided by majority rule. Proposition 8 provides the answer to this question, for the case of 
















𝐵. Under majority rule, 𝑐𝐴
∗ = 𝑐𝐴 and 𝑐𝐵
∗ = 𝑐𝐵 if 𝜆 =
1
2, while limiting turnout is equal to 




The above proposition tells us that if the election is decided by majority rule then, even with 
paternalistic voters, turnout converges to zero, unless the electorate is evenly split, in which case 
everyone votes. Interestingly, Evren (2010) obtains the same result in a model in which a part of 27 
 
the electorate has other-regarding preferences, under the assumption that their proportion is 
known. Proposition 8 highlights the necessity of assuming a smooth policy rule in our 
framework in order to overcome the paradox of voting in a general sense, that is for any possible 
composition of the electorate. The intuition is that, under majority rule, if the electorate is 
unevenly split the higher benefit of voting that a paternalistic individual enjoys in a larger 
population is dominated by the lower probability of being pivotal, with the latter going to zero 
faster then 𝑁 goes to infinity.  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion  
Since the seminal work of Ledyard (1981, 1984) and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985), 
economists have commonly modeled elections as participation games where voters pay a cost to 
vote. The prominence of such models can be explained by their game theoretic micro 
foundations, and their ability to generate predictions which are consistent with notions of 
strategic voting behavior and the comparative statics results that have been documented in 
empirical studies of election outcomes. While popular, current formulations of the costly voting 
model typically confront one major drawback – the paradox of voting which was first described 
in decision theoretic terms by Anthony Downs (1957).   
Several attempts have been made to solve the paradox (see Feddersen, 2004, for a review) and 
thus reconcile costly voting models with the evidence that a substantial fraction of the population 
turns out to vote. Among all of these approaches, Feddersen and Sandroni’s work is perhaps the 
most successful example. Unfortunately, while their framework yields strong comparative statics 
predictions and positive turnout, their model is inherently non-strategic with regards to members 
of the same party. 28 
 
In this paper we approach the problem from a different perspective, developing a parsimonious 
game theoretic model that builds on the basic framework of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985).  We 
extend their analysis in two ways. Our primary innovation is the adoption of a smooth politician 
framework under which election outcomes are mapped into policy decisions through a policy 
function that is continuous in election margins. Second, similar in some ways to the work of 
Feddersen and Sandroni, we assume paternalistic voters.  Under this new model, when citizens 
are paternalistic, large elections yield strictly positive turnout both in terms of numbers and 
proportions.  Conversely, the model predicts that, if the supporters of at least one party are purely 
selfish, turnout will converge to zero as the electorate grows; thus, we extend Palfrey and 
Rosenthal’s (1985) theorem to a general class of smooth policy functions.  A similar result holds 
for the case of paternalism & majority rule. Indeed, under the winner-take-all assumption, if the 
electorate is unevenly split, turnout converges to zero – even when voters are paternalistic, while 
everyone votes if the electorate is evenly split. Finally, our framework yields sensible 
comparative statics predictions, namely the underdog and competition effect, that were believed 
to be only properties of small elections (see Taylor and Yildirim, 2010). 
Thus, our analysis demonstrates that by reconceptualizing a paternalistic model of costly voting 
to incorporate a smooth policy function – an arguably more realistic description of the policy 
process – it is possible to reconcile the small sample predictions of the costly voting framework 
with a game theoretic large electorate environment.  
Finally, we note that in a concurrent working paper, Evren (2010) also overcomes the paradox of 
voting in a costly voting framework.  Similar to the model of Feddersen and Sandroni, Evren 
assumes altruistic voters and a winner-take-all election. Evren’s definition of altruism partially 
corresponds to our notion of paternalism, in that a voter does not incorporate other individuals’ 29 
 
benefits in her own utility function (as altruism is typically understood), but rather projects her 
own preference onto other citizens; he also assumes, though, that individuals care about the 
voting costs of others, thus following in the spirit of Feddersen and Sandroni.  In this framework, 
Evren shows that, if there is uncertainty about the proportion of the population who are altruistic 
voters, the rule utilitarian assumption is not necessary to generate positive turnout in large 
elections. 
It is an open question about which assumption is a more appropriate description of the driving 
force behind voter behavior: expectations regarding the importance of mandate or uncertainty 
regarding the composition of the electorate.  We consider Evren’s paper and ours to be 
complements and view an exploration of their relative merits as fertile ground for future 
research.       
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Suppose citizens play according to the strategy defined by (1) and thresholds 𝑐̂𝐴 and 𝑐̂𝐵. Then for 
a supporter of party 𝐴 the expected gross benefit from voting is given by 




















𝐵(𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴)] �𝐺 �
𝑉𝐴+1
𝑉𝐴+𝑉𝐵+1� − 𝐺 �
𝑉𝐴
𝑉𝐴+𝑉𝐵




𝐵(𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴)]                                                         𝑖𝑓 𝑉 𝐴 + 𝑉𝐵 = 0
 . 
Similarly 𝐸[𝐵𝐵(𝑐̂𝐴,𝑐̂𝐵)] represents the expected gross benefit from voting for a supporter of 
party 𝐵 and is calculated in an analogous way. For this to be an equilibrium, it must be the case 
that the supporter of 𝐴 with cost 𝑐̂𝐴 and the supporter of 𝐵 with cost 𝑐̂𝐵 must be indifferent 
between voting and abstaining when all other players adopt the same strategy. 
To prove the existence of such equilibrium we construct the function 
Φ(𝑐̂𝐴,𝑐̂𝐵) = �max�min{ 𝐸[𝐵𝐴(𝑐̂𝐴,𝑐̂𝐵)],𝑐𝐴},𝑐𝐴�,max�min{𝐸[𝐵𝐵(𝑐̂𝐴,𝑐̂𝐵)],𝑐𝐵},𝑐𝐵��. 
As both 𝐸[𝐵𝐴(𝑐̂𝐴,𝑐̂𝐵)] and 𝐸[𝐵𝐵(𝑐̂𝐴,𝑐̂𝐵)] are continuous in 𝑐̂𝐴 and 𝑐̂𝐵, then Φ(𝑐̂𝐴,𝑐̂𝐵) is also 
continuous. Hence, by Brower’s fixed point theorem there must exist a pair (𝑐𝐴
∗,𝑐𝐵






∗ ∈ �𝑐𝑃,𝑐𝑃�, then all supporters of party 𝑃 with cost less than 𝑐𝑃
∗ will 
vote and those with higher costs will abstain. Similarly, if 𝑐𝑃
∗ = 𝑐𝑃 all members of party 𝑃 will 
abstain, while if 𝑐𝑃
∗ = 𝑐𝑃 they will all vote.∎ 
Proof of Proposition 2 
In order to evaluate the limit of Equation (2), we must consider two cases. 31 
 
i) In the first case, suppose that 𝑐𝐴
∗ = 𝑐𝐴 and 𝑐𝐵
∗ = 𝑐𝐵, implying that 𝜈𝐴 = 𝜈𝐵 = 0. Here, all other 
citizens choose not to vote with probability 1. As a result, the returns to voting for a supporter of 
party 𝐴 are given by: 
𝐸[𝐵𝐴|𝜈𝐴 + 𝜈𝐵 = 0] = 𝐸 �
1
2�1 + 𝑁Γ �𝐴��. 
Given that 𝜆 ̂ → 𝜆, in the limit, as 𝑁 → ∞, then Γ �𝐴 converges to Γ 𝐴. Hence the returns to voting 
become infinite if Γ 𝐴 > 0, while they are equal to 
1
2 when Γ 𝐴 = 0. Clearly, the same holds for a 
supporter of party 𝐵, with the gross benefit from voting equal to either infinity or 
1
2 when Γ𝐵 > 0 
or Γ𝐵 = 0, respectively. If Γ 𝐴 = Γ𝐵 = 0, this implies that 𝑐𝐴
∗ = 𝑐𝐴 and 𝑐𝐵
∗ = 𝑐𝐵 can only be an 
equilibrium if 𝑐𝐴 ≥
1
2 and 𝑐𝐵 ≥
1
2. On the other hand, if at least one between Γ 𝐴 and Γ𝐵 is strictly 
positive, then it cannot be the case that 𝑐𝐴
∗ = 𝑐𝐴 and 𝑐𝐵
∗ = 𝑐𝐵 in equilibrium. 
ii) In the second case, suppose 𝑐𝑃
∗ > 𝑐𝑃 for at least for one party. As a result, for at least one type 
the probability of voting is strictly positive, which translates into 𝜈𝐴 + 𝜈𝐵 > 0. We begin by 
showing that for this case the Plim of the second term in Equation (2) is zero and can thus be 
ignored. To see this, first note that the second half of this term is the probability that no one 
votes.  Following the approach taken by Taylor and Yildirim (2010) it is easy to show that the 
limiting marginal distributions of �𝜈̂𝐴𝜆 ̂𝑁,𝜈̂𝐵�1 − 𝜆 ̂�𝑁� are independent Poisson distributions 
with means equal to {𝜈𝐴𝜆𝑁,𝜈𝐵(1 − 𝜆)𝑁}.
9 As a result, 






𝑒𝑁�𝜈𝐴𝜆+𝜈𝐵(1−𝜆)�.                      
Next assume, without loss of generality, that 𝗾𝐴
𝐴 ≥ 𝗾𝐴
𝐵 and note that 𝜆 < 1. Thus, 
lim𝑁→∞ 𝐸 �
1
2�1 + 𝑁Γ �𝐴��𝜈̂𝐴𝜆 ̂𝑁 + 𝜈̂𝐵�1 − 𝜆 ̂�𝑁 = 0� ∗ 𝑃�𝜈̂𝐴𝜆 ̂𝑁 + 𝜈̂𝐵�1 − 𝜆 ̂�𝑁 = 0� ≤
                                                           






2𝑒𝑁�𝜈𝐴𝜆+𝜈𝐵(1−𝜆)� = 0. 
We now turn to the first term in Equation (2). For simplicity of notation let us define 
                                             ∆=
𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 ��
�𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �𝑁+𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 ��𝑁+1��𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �+𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 ���. 
We can re-write the expression over which we are taking the expectation as: 
�
1
𝑁 + Γ �𝐴�𝑁∆
�𝐺�
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �+𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 ��+∆�−𝐺�
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �+𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 ����
∆ . 
Recall that, by construction, this term is limited to outcomes where 𝜈̂𝐴𝜆 ̂𝑁 + 𝜈̂𝐵�1 − 𝜆 ̂�𝑁 > 0. 





𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �𝑁+𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 ��𝑁+∆�−𝐺�
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �𝑁
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �𝑁+𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 ��𝑁��
∆ = 𝐺′ �
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �𝑁
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �𝑁+𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 ��𝑁�. 





𝑁 + Γ �𝐴�𝑁∆
�𝐺�
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �+𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 ��+∆�−𝐺�
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �+𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 ����
∆ �𝜈̂𝐴𝜆 ̂𝑁 + 𝜈̂𝐵�1 − 𝜆 ̂�𝑁 > 0 =
Γ �𝐴
𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 ��
�𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �+𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 ���
2𝐺′ �
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �
𝜈 �𝐴𝜆 �+𝜈 �𝐵�1−𝜆 ���.                                                                                             (A1) 
Recall that the 𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜆 ̂ = 𝜆, 𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜈̂𝐴𝜆 ̂ = 𝜈𝐴𝜆 and 𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜈̂𝐵�1 − 𝜆 ̂� = 𝜈𝐵(1 − 𝜆). This fact, 
combined with the result that the second term of Equation (2) converges to zero, implies that, 
conditional on 𝜈̂𝐴𝜆 ̂𝑁 + 𝜈̂𝐵�1 − 𝜆 ̂�𝑁 > 0, in the limit Equation (2) collapses to 




𝜈𝐴𝜆+𝜈𝐵(1−𝜆)�                                                      
Finally, recalling that in equilibrium individuals use a threshold voting strategy, the probability 
𝜈𝑃 that a member of the generic party 𝑃 votes is equal to 𝐹𝑃(𝑐𝑃
∗). Hence, we can re-write the 













∗)(1−𝜆)�.                                  (A2) 












∗)(1−𝜆)�.                                 (A3) 
This implies that, in equilibrium, we have 
𝑐𝐴

























∗)(1−𝜆)�.                           (A5) 
Suppose Γ 𝐴,Γ𝐵 > 0. We are going to show that equilibrium turnout is bounded away from zero. 












Therefore, from equations (A4) and (A5) we know that, in equilibrium, the following holds 














𝐵𝜆(1−𝜆) .                                  (A6) 




∗ > 0 and, as a consequence, there exists a function 𝜙 such that 
𝑐𝐵





∗ > 0. Moreover, 𝐹𝐵�𝜙(𝑐𝐴
∗)� → 0 when 𝑐𝐴
∗ → 𝑐𝐴. 
Suppose that 𝑐𝐴
∗ → 𝑐𝐴 when 𝑁 → ∞. This implies that, at the limit, the benefit from voting for an 
𝐴-member is less than or equal to 𝑐𝐴. Notice from (A2) that, since 𝐺′(∙) is finite and strictly 
























 and equation (A6) implies that 𝑐𝐵
∗ goes to 34 
 
𝑐𝐵 as 𝑐𝐴
∗ goes to 𝑐𝐴, it must be the case that: 









𝜆2 = 𝑘 < ∞.                                    (A7) 
Working with Equation (A3), by similar logic, as 𝑐𝐴
∗ goes to 𝑐𝐴 the benefit from voting for a B-







(1−𝜆)2 Γ𝐵𝐺′(∙).                                                  (A8) 
Note that, if the condition outlined in (A7) holds, it must be the case that 𝐹𝐵�𝜙(𝑐𝐴
∗)� goes to zero 
faster than 𝐹 𝐴(𝑐𝐴
∗). However, this implies that expression (A8) tends to infinity and thus each 𝐵-
supporter votes in equilibrium. Analogously, it can be shown that if 𝑐𝐵
∗ → 𝑐𝐵 then the benefit 
from voting for an 𝐴-member tends to infinity, proving that turnout is bounded away from zero 
in equilibrium. Moreover, notice from (A6) that if 𝑐𝐵
∗ > 𝑐𝐵 then 𝑐𝐴
∗ > 𝑐𝐴, and vice versa, which 
means that in equilibrium turnout is positive for both parties. 
Finally, suppose Γ𝑃 = 0. In this case, the limiting benefit from voting for a member of party 𝑃 is 
equal to zero, which means that 𝑐𝑃
∗ cannot be greater than 𝑐𝑃 when 𝑁 → ∞. This in turns implies 
that the benefit from voting for a member of party 𝑃 tends to zero, even if Γ𝑃 > 0, and as a 
consequence 𝑐𝑃
∗ → 𝑐𝑃. Therefore, unless both Γ 𝐴 and Γ𝐵 are strictly positive, equilibrium turnout 
is either zero, if  Γ 𝐴 = Γ𝐵 = 0, 𝑐𝐴 ≥
1
2 and 𝑐𝐵 ≥
1
2, or converges to zero otherwise. ∎ 
Proof of Corollary 1 
This result follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 2. ∎ 
Proof of Lemma 1 























The above expression reduces to 











2 .                                          (A9) 
From (A9) we can see that the sign of the derivative is zero if 𝗾𝐴
𝐵 = 𝗾𝐵
𝐴 = 0 (i.e. citizens are 







𝜕𝜆  equals 































∗)��.                    



























Therefore, it must be the case that 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛�
𝜕𝑐𝐴
∗



















































∗) > 0. Suppose 
𝜕𝑐𝐴
∗
𝜕𝜆 > 0 and 
𝜕𝑐𝐵
∗
𝜕𝜆 < 0. 
The left hand side of the above inequality would be positive, while the right hand side would be 
negative, which cannot be. ∎  
Proof of Proposition 3 






















∗�(1−𝜆)�.      (A11) 
When 𝜆 → 0, Equation (A10) reduces to 𝑐𝐵
∗𝐹𝐵(𝑐𝐵
∗)2 = 0 and therefore 
lim𝜆→0 𝐹𝐵(𝑐𝐵
∗) = 0.                                                           (A12) 
Analogously, Equation (A11) reduces to 𝑐𝐴
∗𝐹 𝐴(𝑐𝐴
∗)2 = 0 when 𝜆 → 1, implying that 
lim𝜆→1 𝐹 𝐴(𝑐𝐴
∗) = 0.                                                           (A13) 










𝐵. This, together with 
(A12), implies that lim𝜆→0 𝐹𝐵(𝑐𝐵
∗) =lim𝜆→0 𝐹 𝐴(𝑐𝐴
∗) = 0. Similarly, given (A13), we 
conclude that lim𝜆→1𝐹 𝐴(𝑐𝐴
∗) =lim𝜆→1 𝐹𝐵(𝑐𝐵
∗) = 0. 







when 𝜆 → 0. Given (A12), since 𝐺′(∙) is always positive and finite, the latter tends to 
infinity and lim𝜆→0𝐹 𝐴(𝑐𝐴







∗)� and, given (A13), lim𝜆→1 𝐹𝐵(𝑐𝐵
∗) = 1.∎ 
Proof of Proposition 4 

























Proof of Proposition 5 
Given Proposition 3, we know that, by continuity, there must exist at least one value 𝜆 ̃ such that 
𝑐𝐴
∗�𝜆 ̃� = 𝑐𝐵








𝜕𝜆 < 0 and, therefore, when 
𝑐𝐴
∗ = 𝑐𝐵






𝜕𝜆 . However, if there were more than one crossing point, 37 
 






𝜕𝜆  for at least one of these points, which cannot be. This proves that there 
exists a unique 𝜆 ̃ such that 𝑐𝐴
∗�𝜆 ̃� = 𝑐𝐵
∗�𝜆 ̃�, 𝑐𝐴
∗(𝜆) > 𝑐𝐵
∗(𝜆)∀𝜆 < 𝜆 ̃ and 𝑐𝐴
∗(𝜆) < 𝑐𝐵
∗(𝜆)∀𝜆 > 𝜆 ̃. 
Suppose 𝜆 =
1




































2�, which implies that 𝜆 ̃ <
1











2�, meaning that 𝜆 ̃ >
1
2. ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Consider first the case of Exclusive voters. Since 𝗾𝐴
𝐵 = 𝗾𝐵







𝐵. We know from Proposition 4 that in this case 𝑐𝐴
∗(𝜆) = 𝑐𝐵
















𝐴 + (1 − 𝜆)𝗾𝐵
𝐵] = (1 − 𝜆)𝑐𝐵
∗𝐹(𝑐𝐵
∗)[𝜆𝗾𝐴
𝐴 + (1 − 𝜆)𝗾𝐴
𝐵].                 (A14) 













𝐵, this implies that 𝜆(𝗾𝐴
𝐴 − 𝗾𝐵
𝐴) ≤ (1 − 𝜆)(𝗾𝐵
𝐵 − 𝗾𝐴





𝐴) ≥ (1 − 𝜆)(𝗾𝐵
𝐵 − 𝗾𝐴
𝐵) when 𝜆 >
1
2. Re-arranging we have 𝜆𝗾𝐵




𝐵 if 𝜆 <
1
2 and 𝜆𝗾𝐵
𝐴 + (1 − 𝜆)𝗾𝐵
𝐵 ≤ 𝜆𝗾𝐴
𝐴 + (1 − 𝜆)𝗾𝐴
𝐵 for 𝜆 >
1
2. In addition, we know 
that 𝑐𝐴
∗ > 𝑐𝐵




∗ when 𝜆 >
1
2. Hence, from (A14) we can conclude that 
𝜆𝐹(𝑐𝐴
∗) < (1 − 𝜆)𝐹(𝑐𝐵
∗) when 𝜆 <
1
2 and 𝜆𝐹(𝑐𝐴
∗) > (1 − 𝜆)𝐹(𝑐𝐵
∗) when 𝜆 >
1



































∗).              (A15) 
We know from Proposition 4 that 𝑐𝐴
∗(𝜆) = 𝑐𝐵


















depends entirely on 
𝜕𝑐𝐴
∗











∗) + 𝜆(1 − 𝜆)𝐺′′(𝜆)𝐹(𝑐𝐴





















[(1 − 2𝜆)𝐺′(𝜆) + 𝜆(1 − 𝜆)𝐺′′(𝜆)].                (A16) 
Notice that (A16) is positive for 𝜆 <
1
2 and negative for 𝜆 >
1
2.∎ 
Proof of Proposition 8 
Consider a sequence 𝐺𝑚(𝑧𝑃) such that all the properties of 𝐺(∙) hold for any 𝑚 and, moreover, 
𝐺𝑚
′′(𝑧𝑃) > 0 for 𝑧𝑃 <
1






0        𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑃 ∈ [0,1 2) ⁄  
1 2         𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑃 = 1 2 ⁄ ⁄
1         𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑃 ∈ (1 2,1] ⁄
. 
When 𝑚 → ∞, 𝐺𝑚 converges to a unit step function, thus representing majority rule. 
Let us first focus on 𝑧𝑃 ∈ [0,
1
2). From lim𝑚→∞ 𝐺𝑚(𝑧𝑃) = 0∀𝑧𝑃 ∈ [0,
1
2) it follows that ∀𝑧𝑃 <
1
2, 
given 𝜀 > 0, there exist 𝜇 > 0 and 𝑀 such that 
𝐺𝑚(𝑧𝑃+𝜇)−𝐺𝑚(𝑧𝑃)
𝜇 < 𝜀 ∀ 𝑚 > 𝑀. Since 𝐺𝑚
′′(𝑧𝑃) >39 
 
0 for 𝑧𝑃 <
1
2, we know that 
𝐺𝑚(𝑧𝑃+𝜇)−𝐺𝑚(𝑧𝑃)
𝜇 > 𝐺𝑚
′(𝑧𝑃). Hence, ∀𝑧𝑃 ∈ [0,
1
2), given 𝜀 > 0, there 
exists 𝑀 such that 𝐺𝑚
′(𝑧𝑃) < 𝜀 ∀ 𝑚 > 𝑀.  




2 and lim𝑚→∞ 𝐺𝑚(𝑧𝑃) = 0∀𝑧𝑃 ∈ [0,
1
2) it also follows that ∀𝑧𝑃 <
1
2, 






𝜎 > 𝐾 ∀ 𝑚 > 𝑀 ̇ . As 
𝐺𝑚
′′(𝑧𝑃) > 0 for 𝑧𝑃 <
1






� > 𝐾 ∀ 𝑚 > 𝑀 ̇ . 
Since 𝐺𝑚 is symmetric around 𝑧𝑃 =
1
2 ∀ 𝑚, it follows that: ∀𝑧𝑃 ∈ (
1
2,1], given 𝜀 > 0, there 
exists 𝑀 such that 𝐺𝑚






� > 𝐾 ∀ 𝑚 > 𝑀 ̇ . 
This proves that 
lim𝑚→∞ 𝐺𝑚
′(𝑧𝑃) = �
0          𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑃 ∈ [0,1 2) ⁄  
∞               𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑃 = 1 2 ⁄
0          𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑃 ∈ (1 2,1] ⁄
.                                  (A17) 
From Proposition 6 we know that in equilibrium the share of the votes for the two parties will 
only be equal when 𝜆 =
1
2. Hence, if 𝜆 =
1













∗)(1−𝜆)� = ∞ and, from Proposition 2 follows that, under majority rule, 
𝑐𝐴
∗ = 𝑐𝐴 and 𝑐𝐵
∗ = 𝑐𝐵. Whenever  𝜆 ≠
1
2, the equilibrium share of the votes for the two parties will 













∗)(1−𝜆)� = 0. As a consequence, 
Proposition 2 implies that, under majority rule, limiting turnout is equal to zero. ∎      40 
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